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Abstract
This paper examines the empirical literature on financial market
contagion in Asia during the 1997–98 financial crises with respect
to existing tests of contagion. Empirical evidence shows that con-
tagion affects both developed and emerging markets and does
not seem to vary with the relative fundamental economic health
or trade and financial linkages of the Asian economies. Contagion
occurs across both asset types and geographical borders and
tends to have larger effects in equity markets than in currency and
bond markets. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that
contagion is regional and transmitted through developed markets.
A discussion of the behavior of correlation coefficients in the
presence of contagion and financial crises suggests that they are
not a reliable metric for detecting contagion.
1. Introduction
Despite a relatively large amount of empirical literature
addressing the issue of the existence of contagion between
countries and markets during ªnancial crises, there is little
consensus on the results. Of course this creates difªculties
for policymakers and researchers in assessing whether or
not contagion exists and whether it is truly a problem
upon which policy should or could be focused. This paper
canvases related issues across the literature on contagion
in the context of the Asian ªnancial crisis in 1997–98. The
Asian crisis focused market participants, policymakers,
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and researchers on the issue of contagion, even though the transmission of ªnancial
crises to other countries, such as the 1987 stock market collapse (King and
Wadhwani 1990) and the 1994–95 Mexican peso crisis, which spawned the so-called
tequila effect (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996), occurred earlier.
The deªnition of contagion in the academic literature has been an evolving concept,
which has served as an obstacle to reaching a consensus on its relevance in explain-
ing crises. During the Asian ªnancial crisis, contagion was used commonly in the
popular press to describe the dramatic spread of the crisis, while academics had
many competing deªnitions. In the last few years, a terminology has developed to
distinguish the categories of contagion that are recognized in the existing frame-
works for conducting empirical analysis. The major distinction is between funda-
mentals-based contagion and pure contagion (see Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens
2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000). Fundamentals-based contagion refers to the
transmission of shocks between countries or markets routed through real links such
as trade, macroeconomic similarities, ªnancial links such as banking linkages and
capital ºows, or linkages that could have been anticipated ex ante the shock to asset
markets. Fundamentals-based contagion reºects that a crisis in one country will
spill over to other countries based on linkages as a result of normal levels of
ªnancial and economic integration.
Pure contagion refers to the transmission of shocks over and above that which oc-
curs through fundamental linkages. In periods of crisis, markets are suddenly more
integrated compared to tranquil times.1 These hypothesized additional linkages in-
clude competitive devaluations in which terms-of-trade effects hasten rapid devalu-
ations between economies but are mainly focused on the role of investor behavior.
The importance of investor behavior in transmitting contagion across countries is
explained in concepts such as wake-up calls, in which market participants focus
their attention on countries with fundamental indicators comparable to those in cri-
sis countries; portfolio adjustment or rebalancing, in which accounting and market
structures provide incentives for individual portfolio managers to make similar
moves at the same time, thus propagating crises between countries (Kodres and
Pritsker 2002); herd behavior, in which uncertainty and the possibility of informa-
tion asymmetries cause investors to follow the crowd (Calvo and Mendoza 2000);
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1 In the extreme case of two markets being fully integrated in tranquil times, if one market ex-
periences a crisis, then the second market will also experience a crisis. In this case there is no
role for contagion, as it is expected that both markets will decline. Alternatively, if there is
usually no integration between two markets in tranquil times, and a crisis occurs in one mar-
ket, it is not expected that the second country will experience a crisis. If this second country
also experiences a crisis, this suggests contagion.
and wealth effects, which arise from the cumulative effect of investors making losses
in one area rushing for liquidity from other areas of their portfolios (Kyle and Xiong
2001).2 Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005a) show that many of
the distinctions in the deªnitions of pure contagion in empirical work are nested.
During the Asian crisis, the term contagion was fairly broadly deªned and could
mean any or all of these things.
Earlier literature tends to use the term contagion to refer to both fundamentals-based
and pure contagion effects, such as Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1996).
More recently, contagion refers principally to pure contagion effects, and fundamen-
tals-based contagion is considered separately and often labeled as spillovers, a term
due to Masson (1999). The focus on contagion in policymaking and empirical litera-
ture revolves around the importance of understanding linkages between ªnancial
markets during times of crisis and a recognition that such linkages may change in
unexpected ways during periods of turmoil. The optimal policy response to a crisis
should differ depending on the relative importance of fundamentals-based or pure
contagion, as the underlying causes are presumably quite different. This paper as-
sesses the evidence in the literature as to whether contagion is important in the ªrst
place, its characteristics, and whether or not a reaction to it should occur.
Most theoretical models seek to explain why markets appear to be more correlated
during a crisis period. The problem is that theoretical concepts explaining contagion
are difªcult if not impossible to measure empirically, so appealing to the data for
some understanding of the underlying reasons for pure contagion is quite challeng-
ing. Most empirical models of contagion instead look for contagion by examining
the evidence for strengthened linkages during a crisis period. Often this is associ-
ated with some form of test for increased correlation among asset returns, although
some authors point out that increasing correlation is not necessarily an indication of
contagion (Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia 2001, 2005; Forbes and Rigobon 2002;
Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng 2005; Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin
2006b). A number of important overviews of empirical literature exist, including
Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000) and Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), with Bekaert
and Harvey (2003) providing a particular focus on emerging markets.
Empirical literature, in some instances supported by theory, has raised a number of
important propositions about contagion during ªnancial crises. This is augmented
by agendas arising from international bodies, such as the 1998 Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) survey of market participants following the Russian and
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2 For overviews of these concepts, see Goldstein (1998), Lowell, Neu, and Tong (1998), and
Dungey and Tambakis (2005).
long-term capital management (LTCM) crises. These propositions provide a frame-
work for understanding potential policy responses to contagion. Seven such propo-
sitions are synthesized below.
1. Strong fundamentals imply immunity to contagion.
2. Trade and ªnancial linkages between countries are associated with contagion
transmission.
3. Regional proximity is important in transmitting/receiving contagion effects.
4. Emerging markets experience greater contagion than developed markets.
5. Developed markets operate as a conduit for contagion effects between regions.
6. Contagion effects differ by asset market.
7. Contagion occurs across both asset market and country borders.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents data relating to the
Asian ªnancial crisis along with a brief background of events. Section 3 examines is-
sues arising from using changes in correlation as the measure to distinguish crises
and contagion in a formal model. The paper then canvases evidence for contagion
during the Asian ªnancial crisis from the empirical literature across different asset
classes in section 4. Section 5 turns to the seven propositions previously listed to ex-
amine evidence as to whether pure contagion is a relatively important inºuence on
asset returns, or alternatively, whether domestic or world/regional inºuences, in-
cluding fundamentals-based contagion, are of greater importance. Section 6 pro-
vides some concluding comments.
2. The crisis in Asia
The events of the 1997–98 Asian crisis have been examined in great detail. Some of
the key events of this crisis include the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997; the
Hong Kong speculative attack of October 1997; the devaluation and ºoat of other
Asian currencies during the period; the coordinated rollover of Korea’s short-term
debt by commercial banks to avoid a debt moratorium in December 1997; the clos-
ing or restructuring of ªnancial institutions in most crisis countries including Indo-
nesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand; the imposition of capital controls in Malaysia
in 1998; the change of political leadership in all countries excluding Malaysia (al-
though there the deputy prime minister, who also served as the ªnance minister,
was ªred); and the dramatic reduction of sovereign ratings for all crisis countries.
Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea all sought IMF assistance packages, and many in-
dustrial countries pledged ªnancial assistance. For chronologies of the crisis, see
Bank for International Settlements (1998), IMF (1999), Kaminsky and Schmukler
(1999), Athukorala (2001), and Baur and Fry (2006).
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Figures 1 and 2 show daily currency and equity returns for a selection of economies
most affected by the crisis over the period. The currency returns are presented from
2 June 1997 to 30 June 1998. Many of the Asian currencies were pegged prior to this
date. A longer period is covered in the ªgures on equity returns, which are shown
from 2 January 1996 to 31 July 1998. The ªgures highlight the speed with which the
Asian crisis spread across different asset classes in the Asian economies.
The implications of the lack of consensus on the transmission process in the Asian
crisis are evident in the response of national and international policymaking bodies.
There were numerous calls for the reform of international ªnancial infrastructure to
halt the potential transmission of crises via contagion; for example, Claessens and
Forbes (2001), Goldstein (1998), Eichengreen (1999), and Vines and Gilbert (2004).
Many of the original proposals focused on reforms to national economic systems
through transparency, domestic regulation, improved national economic manage-
ment, and development of domestic ªnancial markets. This agenda has not been
universally popular with the crisis countries, as it puts the burden of adjustment on
those countries that have already borne the greatest cost. For example, Radelet and
Sachs (1998) and Germain (2002) argue that the crucial change needed post-crisis is
to reshape international ªnance as inclusive of emerging market economies, which
is a political agenda rather than a purely economic one.
3. Preliminary tests of contagion using correlations
The preliminary work on testing for contagion involved testing for a change in the
correlation of asset markets between crisis and noncrisis periods. Early work was by
King and Wadhwani (1990) and Baig and Goldfajn (1999). Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) are associated with a heteroskedasticity-adjusted correlation test that fa-
mously ªnds little evidence of contagion during a number of ªnancial crises, includ-
ing from Hong Kong equity markets in 1998.
Figure 3 presents selected rolling correlations between daily equity returns for Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand surrounding four crisis events. The
window width is one month. The four rows of the ªgure correspond to the four
events selected:
1. the Thai baht devaluation of July 1997, with the panel covering 2 June to 31 July
1997;
2. the Hong Kong speculative attack from 1 October 1997 to 14 November 1997;
3. the period surrounding the successful avoidance of the Korean debt moratorium
on 24 December 1997, with the ªgure covering the month of December;
4. the turmoil in Indonesia from 1 January to 27 February 1998.
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Figure 3. Rolling correlations of daily equity returns calculated over a monthly window
around four key events
Note: First column based on actual data; second column based on the residuals from a VAR containing all equity returns with one lag.
Panel (a) correlation with Thailand, 2 June–31 July 1997; (b) correlation with Hong Kong, 1 October–14 November 1997; (c) correlation
with Korea, 1–31 December 1997; (d) correlation with Indonesia, 1 January–27 February 1998.
The ªrst column in the ªgure presents correlation coefªcients calculated on equity
returns, and the second presents correlation coefªcients calculated on the residuals
of a vector autoregression (VAR) model containing all returns with one lag. The cor-
relations of the residuals of the VAR are reported, as tests for contagion such as that
proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) attempt to capture fundamental relation-
ships through a VAR, so contagion is identiªed through the modeling of outliers.
From inspection of Figure 3, it is immediately obvious that the correlations are not
stable, either before or after fundamentals are controlled for. More pertinently, it is
not clear that correlations necessarily increase after a shock: the Thai baht devalua-
tion is an example in which correlations increase, whereas the Hong Kong shock is
an example in which they decrease.
3.1 A model of asset returns
To better assess what the correlation analysis presented above might represent in
identifying contagion, a ªnancial market model with its origins in the factor models
of arbitrage pricing theory is speciªed (see Sharpe 1964; Solnik 1974). Two periods
are distinguished in the model. The ªrst is a factor model in which assets are priced
based on “normal” shocks during a noncrisis, or tranquil, period. The second is a
factor model which extends the tranquil-period factor model by allowing for addi-
tional linkages arising from contagion and various types of structural breaks that
potentially arise during ªnancial crises.
A model for tranquil times The model in a noncrisis period in the case of three
assets consists of a one-factor model in which returns (xi,t) are speciªed as a function
of a common factor (wt) and an idiosyncratic component (ui,t):
xi,t  iwt  iui,t, i  1, 2, 3, (1)
where for simplicity
wt  N(0,1), (2)
ui,t  N(0,1), i  1, 2, 3, (3)
are assumed to be independent. For simplicity, all returns are assumed to be de-
meaned, in which case there is no need for a constant term in (1). The common fac-
tor captures market fundamentals or systematic risk that has an impact on asset re-
turns with a loading of i. This factor is also interpreted as a measure of integration.
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The idiosyncratic components capture those periods in which returns deviate from
their market fundamentals and have an impact on asset returns with a loading of i.
In the special case in which 1  2  3  0, the markets are segmented with vola-
tility in asset returns, which are driven entirely by their respective idiosyncratic
components. The assumption that the world and idiosyncratics are distributed as
N(0,1) can be relaxed by including autocorrelation and conditional volatility in the
form of generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), as in
Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003).
Estimation issues The assumption that the common factor (wt) and the idiosyn-
cratic factors (ui,t) are independent implies that the volatility of returns as measured
by the variance is obtained by squaring both sides of (1) and taking expectations:
E [ ]xi,t
2  li
2 fi
2, i  1, 2, 3. (4)
This expression shows that the variance of returns can be conveniently decomposed
into two components: the contribution from the common factor (li
2) and the contri-
bution from the idiosyncratic factor (fi
2). An important advantage of this expression
is that it makes it possible to provide an estimate of the average relative contribu-
tions of the two factors to the volatility of returns during tranquil periods.
Similarly, the covariance between returns during periods of tranquility is obtained
from (1) by multiplying xi,t by xj,t and taking expectations:
E [xi,txj,t]  ij, i  j. (5)
During tranquil periods, co-movements in returns are solely determined by the
common factors, with no role played by the idiosyncratic factors. For asset returns
that are affected by the common factor in the same direction, that is, for which the
loading parameters have the same sign, the returns on these assets move in the
same direction on average. For asset returns that are affected by the common factor
in opposite directions, that is, for which the loading parameters are not the same
sign, the returns move in opposite directions on average.
The expressions for the variance in (4) and covariance in (5) suggest that a natural
way to estimate the six parameters of the tranquil model,
{1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3}, (6)
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is to equate the theoretical moments in (4) and (5) with the respective empirical mo-
ments. For a sample of size T, the pertinent set of equations that needs to be solved
is
s11  l 1
2  f1
2 , s22  l 2
2  f2
2, s33  l3
2  f3
2,
s12   l l1 2, s13   l l1 3, s23   l l2 3, (7)
where a ^ denotes an estimator and
sij 
1
1T
x xi t j t
t
T
, ,


(8)
represents the sample covariance (empirical moment) between assets i and j. This is
a system of six equations and six unknowns that can be solved to provide estimates
of the parameters. Formally, estimation proceeds using a generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimator. As the system is in this case just identiªed, as the number
of unknown parameters matches the number of equations, it is possible to derive
the following analytical expressions for the estimators:
l 1
2 12 13
23

s s
s
, l 2
2 12 23
13

s s
s
l3
2 13 23
12

s s
s
,
f1
2 11 23 12 13
23

s s s s
s
, f2
2 22 13 12 23
13

s s s s
s
, f3
2 33 12 13 23
12

s s s s
s
. (9)
A model for crisis times Crisis period relationships can be accounted for by ex-
tending the noncrisis model in (1) to (3) by allowing for structural breaks in the
world factor and idiosyncratic factors, as well as for increases in asset return volatil-
ity from an additional propagation mechanism from one country to another arising
from contagion. To distinguish the crisis period from the noncrisis period, returns
for the former period are denoted as yi,t. As before, these returns are also assumed to
be demeaned. The factor structure during the crisis period for a trivariate system is
speciªed as
y1,t  1wt  1u1,t, (10)
y2,t  2wt  2u2,t  21u1,t, (11)
y3,t  3wt  3u3,t  31u1,t, (12)
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where
wt  N(0,	2), T (13)
ui,t  N(0,ki
2), i  1, 2, 3. (14)
Structural breaks If the common factor is interpreted as representing market fun-
damentals, a change in the pricing of assets during the crisis period as a result of a
change in wt is captured by the parameter 	2 in (13). For 	2 
 1, this leads to an in-
crease in volatility of all asset returns during the crisis period. An alternative form
of a structural break, which increases asset market volatility, occurs when there are
changes in the idiosyncratic components in the crisis period, with ki
2 
 1. It is more
typical to model the structural break in the country directly experiencing the crisis,
otherwise known as the source country. However, for the crisis to spread from the
source country to the other countries in this situation, it is necessary for contagion to
exist.
Contagion Contagion is deªned as shocks originating in the source country over
and above the inºuence of the common factor (wt) which impact the asset returns of
the remaining countries. In the case of the crisis model in (10) to (14), country 1 rep-
resents the source country, with the strength of contagion to countries 2 and 3 con-
trolled by the parameters 2 and 3, respectively.
Estimation issues Estimation of the parameters of the crisis model proceeds along
the lines of that for the tranquil model by adopting a GMM approach whereby the
theoretical moments are matched with the empirical moments. As the parameters in
(6) are uniquely identiªed by the tranquil moments, with the solutions given in (9),
the remaining parameters in the crisis model,
{2, 3, 	, 1, 2, 3}, (15)
are estimated from the following set of equations:
11   l 1
2

   f k1
2
1
2 , 22   l2
2

   f k2
2
2
2    d f k2 1 1
2 , 33   l3
2

   f k3
2
3
2    d f k3 1 1
2 ,
12    l l1 2
    d f k2 1
2
1
2 , 13    l l1 3
    d f k3 1
2
1
2 , 23    l l2 3
     d d f k2 3 1
2
1
2 ,
(16)
where, as before, a ^ denotes an estimator, and
ij 
1
1T
y yi t j t
t
T
, ,


(17)
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represents the sample covariance (empirical moment) between assets i and j during
the crisis period. This is a just-identiªed system, as there are six equations and six
unknowns.
Changes in correlations The factor model given above has the advantage that it
provides convenient expressions for the correlations between asset returns. Using
equations (1) to (3), the correlation between asset 1 and asset 2 during a noncrisis
period is
r
l l
l f l
x x
t t
t t
t t
E x x
E x E x1 2
1 2
1
2
2
2
1 2
1
2
1
2, ,
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
, ,
, ,
 
 2
2
2
2
 f
. (18)
From equations (10) to (14) the corresponding correlation in the crisis period is
r
l l d f
y y
t t
t t
t t
E y y
E y E y1 2
1 2
1
2
2
2
1 2 2 1
2
, ,
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
, ,
, ,
 

 k
l f k l f k d f k
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
 
 
  
. (19)
As a number of theoretical and empirical deªnitions of contagion involve the obser-
vation of an increase in correlation coefªcients between the noncrisis and crisis peri-
ods, it is natural to look at the change in correlation by subtracting (18) from (19):
r r
l l d f k
l f k l
y y x xt t t t1 2 1 2
1 2
2
2 1
2
1
2
1
2 2
1
2
1
2
2
2, , , ,
 



 
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
 

 f k d f k
l l
l f l f
. (20)
There are several parameters that govern the difference in correlations across the
two subperiods. These are di
2, 	2, and ki
2, which are now explored. This analysis is
closely related to that of Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2001, 2005).
3.2 Understanding changes in correlations
To understand the underlying relationships governing changes in correlations,
equation (20) is computed for various parameterizations. This analysis is based on a
simpliªed version of the model in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin
(2006b). The parameterized system is
y1,t  4wt  2u1,t, (21)
y2,t  2wt  3u2,t  22u1,t, (22)
y2,t  3wt  4u2,t  32u1,t, (23)
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and in this case there are no structural breaks in the common or idiosyncratic fac-
tors, so 	2  ki
2  1,  i. In the noncrisis period, the data-generating process for xi,t
is the same as equations (21) to (23) if one sets 2  3  0 and redeªnes yi,t as xi,t.
Figure 4 presents the results of the experiments for the difference in correlations,
with all parameters held constant except for one. Panels (a) and (b) explore the be-
havior of the difference in the correlation coefªcients between assets 1 and 2 and as-
sets 2 and 3, respectively, as the strength of contagion i   increases. Panels (c) and
(d) consider the case in which there is no contagion, but a structural break in the
common factor (	2).
Changes in correlation due to contagion
Asset 1 to asset 3 Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the change in correlation between y1,t
and y3,t for increasing values of contagion from   0 to   20, based on equation
(20) with 	2  2  1. The correlation initially rises but hits a peak and eventually
falls and in the limit becomes negative. The initial increase in correlation is consis-
tent with much of the empirical literature, wherein an increase in correlation indi-
cates evidence of contagion. However, the fall in correlation for strong levels of con-
tagion, that is, higher values of , contradicts the premise that increasing correlation
is associated only with contagion. This result casts doubt on empirical evidence that
ªnds no contagion based on nonincreasing correlation.3
Asset 2 to asset 3 Panel (b) of Figure 4 repeats the analysis for y2,t and y3,t. This
panel appears to provide support for the hypothesis that higher correlation is associ-
ated with higher levels of contagion. However, this result is purely spurious, as the
increase in correlation is fully generated by a common component, namely, u1,t. By
construction, there are no contagious linkages between assets 2 and 3.
Changes in correlation due to systemic structural breaks The effects of increas-
ing systemic shocks (	2) on the change in correlations between y1,t and y3,t and be-
tween y2,t and y3,t is given in panel (c) of Figure 4. In this case, there is no contagion
(  0) and no idiosyncratic structural break (2  1). Despite the fact that the true
process does not involve contagion, there is still an increase in correlation between
the two periods. In the limit, the correlation in the crisis period approaches unity,
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3 Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2006b) show that (20) yields a fall in correla-
tion for high levels of contagion if
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Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2001, 2005) also discuss the problem of measuring contagion
via correlation coefªcients from this angle in some depth.
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reºecting the total domination of the asset returns by the common factor (wt). This
result further highlights the danger of misdiagnosing increasing correlation as evi-
dence of contagion. Most applications for tests of contagion speciªcally assume that
the appropriate process describing the data is the presence of contagion and not a
structural change in the common factor: for example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
and Dungey and Martin (2004). Forbes and Rigobon (2001) speciªcally designate the
situation of a structural change in the common factor as shift contagion.
Relationship with regression analysis The occurrence of a structural break in the
common factor brings out an important relationship between correlation and regres-
sion analysis in testing for contagion. To highlight this relationship, consider a spe-
cial case of the noncrisis and crisis models in (1) to (14) in which 1  0, so country 1
becomes the common factor. From (1) and (10) the asset returns can be expressed in
terms of the ªrst asset return. For example, the second asset return equations for the
noncrisis and crisis periods are, respectively,
x2,t 
l
l
2
1
x1,t  2u2,t  x1,t  2u2,t, (24)
y2,t 
l
l
2
1
y1,t  2u2,t  y1,t  2u2,t,
with   2 /1, where it is still assumed that there is no contagion (i    0) and
that there are no idiosyncratic structural breaks (ki
2  0). The strength of the trans-
mission mechanism between countries 1 and 2 is given by the parameter . As this
parameter is the same over both noncrisis and crisis periods, it can be estimated by
simply regressing the returns of country 2 on the returns of country 1 using the full
sample of data, despite the structural break in the common factor.
The fact that the parameter  in (24) is constant over the two sample periods does
not imply that the correlations are also constant. To see this, in (20), set 1  2  0,
1  2  1, so that the change in the correlation between the crisis and noncrisis pe-
riods reduces to
r r
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This expression is positive for 	2 
 1, whereby the structural break in the common
factor results in an increase in correlation even though the regression parameter in
(24) is constant. This point was ªrst made by Loretan and English (2000) and Forbes
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and Rigobon (2002). This result suggests that the stability of the relationship be-
tween countries 1 and 2 can be assessed by performing a test of parameter con-
stancy. If the null hypothesis of constant parameters is rejected, this will be evidence
of an additional transmission mechanism during the crisis period and hence will
constitute contagion. This forms the basis of the regression-based test of contagion
suggested by Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005a).
4. A review of the empirical evidence for Asian ªnancial markets
Although there are limitations in many of the contagion tests in the suite, as demon-
strated by the correlation coefªcient example above, some generalities can be ex-
tracted from the evidence presented in the empirical literature. Apart from tech-
niques based on correlation analysis, there are several other methodologies by
which researchers test empirically for contagion; these methodologies are reviewed
in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005a). The main empirical tests
include those based on modeling outliers from a VAR system, such as that in Favero
and Giavazzi (2002); dummy variable-based tests such as that in Pesaran and Pick
(2006); and the probability-based measure of Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003), which is
related to the previous work of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995, 1996). Tests
based on latent-factor models, such as those examined by the current authors,
Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2001), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), are also
commonly used. Here, evidence is organized by a particular asset market during the
crisis period.
4.1 Currency markets
Contagion during the Asian ªnancial crisis is widely believed to have originated
with the ºoat and depreciation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997. This date is often
used in empirical applications to mark the start of the crisis despite the fact that
some claim that turmoil was evident in equity markets earlier; see McKibbin and
Martin (1998). The problems in dating ªnancial crises are quite pronounced and rep-
resent one of the issues which make comparisons of results across empirical studies
difªcult. Despite the importance of currency markets in the crisis, the literature on
testing for contagion in Asian currencies is limited, reºecting the fact that these mar-
kets were largely operating under ªxed-exchange-rate regimes prior to 1997, mak-
ing pre-crisis-period volatility comparisons difªcult.
Under the alternative hypothesis that the contemporaneous spread of currency cri-
ses is consistent with contagion, Glick and Rose (1999), using a large panel of ªve
Asian countries, ªnd that the most important economic linkages explaining these
transmissions are trade linkages. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), using a similar
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methodology, ªnd that ªnancial links are more important, although they also note
that as a result of the close relationship between ªnancial and trade linkages it is
difªcult to disentangle the two.
Baig and Goldfajn (1999) show a pronounced increase in correlation coefªcients dur-
ing the crisis period as evidence of contagion. However, the effects of this contagion
on developed markets in the region is muted; notably both Debelle and Ellis (2005)
and Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2004), using an alternative statistical framework,
show small effects of contagion to Australia and New Zealand, and the latter paper
to Japan.
Substantial contagion effects within the Asian region are revealed in Dungey and
Martin (2004). In investigating the links among Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand during 1997–98, Dungey and Martin ªnd statistically signiªcant contagion
effects of up to 46 percent of total volatility for Korea, mostly sourced from Thai-
based shocks. However, although Thailand is the major source of shocks for Korea
and Malaysia, the majority of the effects on Indonesia are transmitted indirectly
through Malaysia.
4.2 Equity markets
Equity markets have probably received the most attention in empirical applications
of contagion tests in East Asian markets. A number of these applications have exam-
ined the effects of contagion during the period associated with the turmoil in the
Hong Kong equity market in late October 1997, including Baig and Goldfajn (1999),
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Baur and Schulze (2005), Baur and Fry (2006), Bond,
Dungey, and Fry (2006), and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005b).
Of these, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Baur and Schulze (2005), and Bond, Dungey,
and Fry (2006) focus on Hong Kong as the identiªed source of the potentially conta-
gious shocks, whereas the others look more generally at contagion in the region.
Kleimeier, Lehnert, and Verschoor (2003) and Baur and Schulze (2005) focus on
Thailand as the source country for the potentially contagious equity market shock.
Studies are divided in their results on the importance of contagion effects in Asian
equity markets. On the one hand, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Kleimeier,
Lehnert, and Verschoor (2003) ªnd little or no evidence of contagion using tests
based on a statistically signiªcant increase in the correlation coefªcient between re-
turns in these markets. Both papers use the same methodology, although Kleimeier,
Lehnert, and Verschoor control precisely for the timing of the observations on the
various equity markets, whereas other studies use market-closing observations, re-
sulting in differences in the effective times across the day. On the other hand, a num-
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ber of papers do ªnd signiªcant contagion effects in East Asia. Caporale, Cipollini,
and Spagnolo (2005) ªnd evidence for contagion in almost all pairs of eight Asian
economies using conditional correlation analysis.4
Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006) show that during the period of 1997–98 associated
with turmoil in Hong Kong, equity and real estate markets behave somewhat differ-
ently, but both indicate statistically signiªcant contagion effects. This paper also em-
phasizes the role of the Japanese and Singaporean markets in helping to transmit the
contagion effects around the region. Contagion from Hong Kong is found to be sig-
niªcant to Singapore and the Philippines by Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2001)
and from Hong Kong to a wide range of Asian economies by Baur and Schulze
(2005). Baur and Fry (2006) ªnd that contagion is signiªcant across 11 countries dur-
ing 8 percent of days over the period of the Asian crisis, with Hong Kong being an
important factor.5
Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005) and Wongswan (2003) also ªnd evidence of signiª-
cant contagion effects within Asia, but not from Asia to other countries or regions.
Wongswan (2003) controls for common effects by ªtting a capital asset pricing
model, including GARCH conditional variances, and examines the correlations
among the residuals across countries and regions. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) uncover
mixed evidence of contagion in equity markets. They ªnd evidence for bivariate
contagion between Korea and each of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand and between Indonesia and Malaysia and Indonesia and Thailand, but not
between other pairings of these countries. There is also evidence of contagion from
both Korean and Thai equity markets to Indonesian equities in Cerra and Saxena
(2002), which uses a Markov switching modeling approach.
The effect of a change in the propagation of the common factor during the Asian cri-
sis as an alternative explanation is explored in Rigobon (2003) using his determinant
of change in covariance (DCC) test. The test does not suggest any break in the prop-
agation in Asia during the Asian crisis but provides some limited evidence that
other countries experienced a change in their propagation coefªcients associated
with the crisis in Thailand during 1997–98, notably India, South Africa, and Russia.
Other evidence on structural breaks by Yang, Kolari, and Min (2003) suggests that
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4 The countries considered are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
5 The countries considered are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
there was some increase in the intensity of the integration among the Asian equity
markets during the crisis period.
4.3 Fixed-income markets
Studies of contagion in ªxed-income markets for Asia are far less common than for
other asset types. This partly arises from the relative stability in these markets up
until the events of August–September 1998, when the Russian government sus-
pended payment and subsequently defaulted on sovereign bond payments, creating
substantial volatility in international bond markets; see the analysis of the period in
the BIS report by the Committee on the Global Financial System (1999).
Only three studies have given particular attention to bond markets with East Asian
markets as the focus. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) conduct a correlation analysis for
bond spreads similar to that for the currency and equity markets and ªnd evidence
of contagion among the Asian sovereign bond markets. Debelle and Ellis (2005) con-
sider links from East Asia to Australia and New Zealand through bond markets and
ªnd evidence of signiªcant but small contagion effects. Sander and Kleimeier (2003)
view contagion as a change in cross-market interdependencies, which they assess
using Granger causality tests during pre-crisis and crisis periods. They ªnd evi-
dence for crisis-related changes in the short-term propagation mechanism, which
they denote as contagion, namely, from the Philippines to Malaysia and Korea; from
Indonesia to the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia; from Malaysia to Thailand;
and from Korea to Indonesia. They attribute their ªnding of no contagion from
Thailand as suggesting that Korea was a more important inºuence. However, this
may well relate to the fact that the crisis in Thailand erupted in currency and equity
markets and was not particularly visible in sovereign debt markets.
4.4 Cross-country linkages and cross-market linkages
In some cases, a particular asset market is hit by an identiªable shock, but this does
not result in unusual levels of volatility in the returns for the asset. The clearest ex-
ample of this phenomenon is the successful defense of managed or ªxed-exchange-
rate arrangements, such as those conducted by the currency board in Hong Kong
over a number of instances in 1997–98. However, it would be incorrect to conclude
that it is possible to isolate economies from the effects of such shocks, as the volatil-
ity was transferred to alternative asset types. In October 1997 and January, June, and
August 1998, speculators attacked the Hong Kong currency board. In each case, the
currency was successfully defended, but substantial volatility emerged in equity
markets.6 The general principle is that ªnancial markets are closely interrelated and
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6 See Goodhart and Dai (2003) for a detailed review of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s
subsequent defense of its currency through equity market intervention.
that studying the transmission in crises across one asset market type in isolation
may not yield the appropriate conclusions, particularly for policymakers who need
to consider the impact on all asset markets and the economy in general.7
Given the well-known linkages between markets and economies in Asia, it is some-
what surprising that contagion in multiple markets has tended to be understudied.
One possible reason is the obvious difªculties in combining models of the different
markets. However, there are some developments in this vein of the literature. A few
papers consider modeling linkages among different asset classes during a crisis
within a particular country: Granger, Huang, and Yang (2000), Fang and Miller
(2002), Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2004), and recently, for pairs of asset
types across geographical borders, Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2004).
Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006) attempt to differentiate transmissions among real es-
tate market instruments from those in the related equity markets by using orthogo-
nal shocks obtained from regressing equity market returns on real estate returns.
Some papers consider different asset types during the same crisis, but not the poten-
tial interactions among them; Baig and Goldfajn (1999) and Debelle and Ellis (2005)
consider a range of markets during the Asian crisis of 1997–98.
More relevant to the current discussion are models that consider transmissions
among multiple markets across potentially different asset types and a number of
economies. Ito and Hashimoto (2005) use a Tobit model on extreme returns to test
for contagion across equity markets and currency markets during the Asian crisis of
1997–98. Khalid and Kawai (2003) conduct Granger causality tests on the residuals
of a VAR across equity, currency, and bond markets. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002)
identify the commonalities in equity, bond, and currency markets across a range of
countries using principal-components methods.
These papers almost always ªnd evidence of statistically signiªcant contagion
across different asset market types. Dungey and Martin (2006) ªnd that equity mar-
ket shocks are contagiously transmitted to currency markets and vice versa. This is
supported by the Granger causality tests in Granger, Huang, and Yang (2000), which
ªnds feedback between equity and currency markets for Malaysia, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Taiwan during the period of 1 June 1997 to 16 June 1998.8 The exception to
the ªnding of cross-market, cross-country linkages is Khalid and Kawai (2003),
which concludes that the evidence for signiªcant contagion is limited.
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7 The seminal work on crises by Kindelberger (1996) discusses the importance of cross-market
ªnancial interlinkages well before the Asian crisis.
8 For other countries in the study, they ªnd Granger causality from equity to currency markets
for Hong Kong and the Philippines and from currency to equity markets for Korea.
A further important conclusion to be drawn from comparing both cross-market and
cross-country evidence is that crises seem to propagate through various asset classes
differently. This is shown to be the case for equity markets and currency markets in
Dungey and Martin (2006), for equity markets and real estate instruments in Bond,
Dungey, and Fry (2006), and for equity and bonds in Hartmann, Straetmans, and
de Vries (2004).
5. Propositions and evidence
This section addresses, in turn, the seven propositions in regard to contagion out-
lined in the introduction. These propositions are investigated by drawing on nine
papers of the authors, using versions of the factor decomposition approach. An ad-
vantage of this approach is that it is possible to decompose volatility into a set of la-
tent factors, including a common factor, an idiosyncratic factor, and contagion fac-
tors, and thereby quantify the magnitude of contagion as a proportion of overall
volatility. Other speciªcations include some combination of regional factors, asym-
metric contagion factors to account for positive or negative contagion effects,
multiple-asset markets, subperiods of contagion within a crisis, and in some appli-
cations, the simultaneous modeling of multiple crises. This factor structure is related
to the model in equations (1) to (14) of Section 3. These papers are summarized in
Table 1 in terms of the crisis addressed, the asset market investigated, the sample of
countries considered, and the factor structure speciªed in the paper.9
5.1 Strong fundamentals imply immunity to contagion
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) suggest that countries with strong fundamentals
experience less contagion than other countries. Athukorala and Warr (2002) go fur-
ther by saying that contagion cannot occur in countries that do not have some un-
derlying “vulnerability,” in terms of some fundamental weakness; see also
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The evidence for Asia is mixed in this respect. Fur-
man and Stiglitz (1998) suggest that the standard macroeconomic fundamentals in
the main crisis countries showed little evidence of weakness ahead of the crisis. In
contrast, Athukorala and Warr (2002) examine the ªnancial fragility, reserve ade-
quacy, and real exchange rate misalignment of the key crisis countries in compari-
son to a set of noncrisis countries and ªnd the opposite result. Using the method of
Frankel and Rose (1996), Furman and Stiglitz (1998) predict a less than 7 percent
probability of a currency crisis in 1997 for Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the
53 Asian Economic Papers
Correlation, Contagion, and Asian Evidence
9 For precise information on the estimation of each model, consult the papers in Table 1. Model
identiªcation and estimation is discussed in general terms for both the tranquil period and
the crisis period in section 3.1.
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Philippines. In contrast 17 other countries are found to have higher probabilities of
crisis.
The focus of existing studies has been on whether fundamentals in Asia were strong
or weak relative to those in other countries that have experienced ªnancial crises, as
in the comparisons with the Mexican peso crisis presented in Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1996), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
However, there may also be insights to be gained by comparing the relative strength
of fundamentals within the crisis-affected countries in conjunction with the degree
of contagion they experienced. The top panel of Table 2 provides details on the rela-
tive values of a selection of fundamental macroeconomic variables for Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. These variables reºect those found to be important
in the ªnancial crisis literature represented by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996),
Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Frankel and Rose (1996).
A good set of economic fundamentals in Table 2 would be composed of a high GDP
per capita, strong GDP growth, a low short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio, low and sta-
ble inºation, a low rate of nonperforming loans, and an exchange rate near its equi-
librium value.10 More difªcult to interpret is the role of openness and export growth.
Typically, openness is seen as a requirement for development, and a high degree of
openness is desirable. Export growth is also generally seen as important to an econ-
omy, indicating strong domestic growth, although it may also be associated with
overheating as in the case of Thailand; see Athukorala and Suphachalasai (2004).
The country with the strongest fundamentals in Table 2 is Korea. It has higher GDP
per capita and higher average GDP growth in the run-up to the crisis, a low rate of
nonperforming loans, and an exchange rate close to equilibrium. However, it also
has the highest short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio of the four countries. Its openness
and export growth are only slightly higher than those of Indonesia, which is clearly
the worst-performing country in the sample on the basis of these indicators. Note
that Kenward (1999) describes the lack of macroeconomic indicators of weakness in
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10 The real exchange rate misalignment in Table 2 is computed relative to an equilibrium
measure based on the predicted value of the real exchange rate in 1996 estimated with levels
of real GDP per capita taking into account the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Furman and
Stiglitz (1998) give four alternate measures, of which this is one, and the extent (and even
sign) of the deviation from equilibrium differs across the measures. Two of the measures
given in Furman and Stiglitz agree with the relative ordering of the extent of misalignment
here, that is, that Malaysia is the most misaligned and Korea the least. The other two mea-
sures suggest that Korea is the most misaligned and Indonesia the least. Hence, the results
vary enormously with the measure chosen, and undue weight should not be placed on the
indicator adopted in Table 2.
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Indonesia prior to the crisis, and Iriana and Sjöholm (2002) ªnd less evidence of
weakness in Indonesia than in other economies in the region but point to the role of
the larger share of short-term debts. Table 2 shows that Indonesia has the least-
favorable GDP per capita, ratio of nonperforming loans, openness, and export
growth criteria. Thailand stands out in the sample of data here only in terms of its
high export growth.
The Malaysian experience places it as the strongest among the four countries in
terms of inºation, short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio, and openness. However, it also
features substantial exchange rate misalignment and lower GDP growth than the
other countries. From this particular selection of economic indicators the relative
economic strength of these economies looks to favor Korea as the strongest, Indone-
sia as the weakest, and Malaysia as stronger than Thailand. Although the economic
indicators selected here are not exhaustive, they are indicative of those in use in the
ªnancial crisis literature.
With this broad ranking in mind, the contributions of contagion to observed volatil-
ity in currency, equity returns, and sovereign debt spreads over U.S. Treasuries can
be assessed. The lower panel of Table 2 presents evidence of the proportion of ob-
served volatility due to contagion while controlling for fundamentals from a num-
ber of the studies carried out by the present authors. The currency market study in
Dungey and Martin (2004) is most informative as it includes all the countries con-
sidered in Table 2.
Korea experiences the greatest contribution to currency market volatility from con-
tagion (46.31 percent), despite its relatively stronger fundamental position revealed
in the ªrst panel of Table 2. Malaysia, however, which is arguably also relatively
well-positioned fundamentally, displays the lowest contribution of contagion at
9.59 percent in this market. In the equity market study of Dungey, Fry, González-
Hermosillo, and Martin (2005b), contagion effects from Hong Kong are a greater
proportion of volatility in Korea (74.45 percent) than Malaysia (49.92 percent), sug-
gesting that Korea had more vulnerability to contagion than Malaysia. In contrast,
contagion effects from Korea to Malaysia were a greater part of Malaysian volatility
(22.65 percent) than were contagion effects from Malaysia to Korea on Korean vola-
tility (10.11 percent). Hence, the evidence is somewhat mixed as to whether Malay-
sia or Korea experienced greater contagion effects in the equity markets.
In bond markets, Thailand experienced the largest contagion effects from the Rus-
sian collapse and LTCM crisis in August 1998 (7.78 percent), while Indonesia experi-
enced little. The small extent of contagion to Indonesia suggests that perhaps after
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its own crisis it developed immunity, at least for a period, to contagion from further
crises; see also Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2006a).
The combination of the evidence on market fundamentals and the extent of conta-
gion effects identiªed provide a mixed picture. While the more general literature on
crises may have drawn the conclusion that poor fundamentals are associated with
more contagion effects, this is hard to discern in comparing the relative performance
of these economies with this set of economic indicators.
5.2 Trade and ªnancial linkages are important
Trade links are regarded as primary mechanisms for contagion in Glick and Rose
(1999). Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) ªnd that ªnancial effects through com-
mon lenders are a more important route of transmission, although trade links may
still be important. A difªculty arises in differentiating trade and ªnancial links if the
two effects are highly correlated, as Van Rijckeghem and Weder demonstrate is the
case for Asia. Athukorala and Warr (2002) argue that trade links cannot be a mecha-
nism of propagation in Asia, as bilateral trade ºows are relatively small among
Asian countries. But this overlooks the trade-related effects of competitive devalua-
tion due to export competition, which is argued as a primary driver of the spread of
the Asian crisis by Goldstein (1998). Baig and Goldfajn (1999) ªnd little evidence for
either trade or competitive devaluation, while De Gregorio and Valdés (2001) pro-
vide empirical evidence that the regional nature of crises and contagion is largely
unrelated to trade links. Karolyi (2003) argues that the focus on trade is misplaced as
contagion reºects rational behavior on the basis of liquidity (those with the most liq-
uid markets may suffer more).
Indicators of ªnancial fragility explored in the existing literature include net invest-
ment ºows, domestic ªnancial liberalization, and banking linkages; see, for exam-
ple, Wyplosz (2001), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, 2003), and Furman and
Stiglitz (1998), inter alia. A number of indicators of the ªnancial position of four East
Asian economies are given in the middle panel of Table 2. The choice of these indi-
cators is again drawn from the relevant literature on ªnancial crises. As with the in-
dicators in regard to fundamentals, there is not a clear relationship between the
ªnancial linkages positions of the four countries and the extent of contagion experi-
enced by each.
While the empirical papers of the current authors canvased here do not provide di-
rect evidence on the importance of trade and ªnancial linkages, there are some ob-
servations that can be drawn out. In the investigations of the Russian and LTCM cri-
ses in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005c, 2006a), some of the
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strongest contagion effects from Russia are felt by countries with strong ªnancial
linkages with Russia. Consistent with the evidence of Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2001, 2003), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Pritsker (2001), the banking expo-
sure of the Netherlands and Germany to Russia seems consistent with the relatively
large contributions of contagion to volatility in their ªnancial markets compared
with other developed markets in the period. On the trade side, it was widely ex-
pected that the Asian crisis would affect the Australian and New Zealand econo-
mies given their strong trade linkages; see Summers (2001) for Australian evidence.
In the event, however, the contagion effects documented in Dungey, Fry, and Martin
(2003, 2004) to the Antipodes are quite small. This small amount of evidence sug-
gests that perhaps trade links are a less important prerequisite for contagion than
are ªnancial linkages in the region.
5.3 Regional proximity is important
A common observation is that crises and contagion pertain to geographically clus-
tered regions with little spillover to other countries. This proposition is intrinsically
related to the hypothesis that trade linkages, which are often between geographi-
cally proximate nations, are important for contagion and may also arise as a result
of portfolio-balancing arguments as well as similarity of fundamentals. The validity
of this proposition is examined by considering the importance of contagion within
regions and the importance of contagion across regions. Although the analysis of
the regional nature of contagion through the empirical work presented here is lim-
ited in that regions that did not suffer during the crises are generally, but not al-
ways, omitted from the sample, there are several instances in which cross-regional
linkages are modeled.
Table 3 summarizes the proportion of observed asset market volatility due to conta-
gion across various papers relating to the Asian ªnancial crisis. It shows that within
the Asian region there is a lot of contagion during the Asian ªnancial crisis. In par-
ticular, contagious linkages in currency markets are strong from Thailand to Korea
and Malaysia, with the contribution of contagion to volatility of currency markets in
Korea and Malaysia greater than 28 percent. Contagion in equity and real estate
markets during the Asian crisis is always strong from Hong Kong to the other Asian
economies. Evidence from other crises in Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and
Martin (2005c, 2006a) shows that during the Russian crisis, contagion from Russia to
Eastern Europe (Poland) is strong in equity markets, but less so in bond markets
(Bulgaria and Poland), which is probably related to thin bond markets in the even-
less-developed Eastern European economies. Similarly, contagion during the U.S.-
based LTCM crisis transmits strongly to Latin America in equity markets, but not in
bond markets.
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Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003, 2004) and Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006) analyze
contagion from Asia to asset markets in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. There is
no systematic contagion to any of these countries from the key crisis countries, al-
though there is substantial contagion in equity and real estate markets from the de-
veloped regional countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan to Australia, and
from Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore to Japan. Debelle and Ellis (2005) also
ªnd little evidence of contagion to Australia from the Asian crisis. The roles of de-
veloped markets in the crisis are discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5.
Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005c, 2006a) model contagion in
bond and equity markets in the Russian and LTCM crises across and within regions,
with the result that there is cross-regional equity market contagion from both Russia
(17 percent) and the United States (14 percent) to Hong Kong, and from Russia to
Brazil (16 percent) in bond markets. During this period Hong Kong was experienc-
ing its own ªnancial turmoil associated with another speculative attack on its cur-
rency board, which was successfully defended by intervention in equity markets
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Table 3. Percentage contribution of contagion to the volatility of various asset markets
during the Asian crisis
Contagion from
Paper Contagion to Asiaa HK I K M T J S US
Equity markets
Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003) Australia 0.59 0.9 0.24 0.67 5.6
Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006)b Australia 33–65 1–12 16–30 0.5
HK 3–20 2–70 1–19
Japan 23–40 7–36 0.6–18
Singapore 10–74 2–70 0.5
US 0.5 1–19
Dungey, Fry, González-
Hermosillo, and Martin
(2005b)
Hong Kong 74.45 49.92
Korea 60.51 22.65
Malaysia 18.1 10.11
Currency markets
Dungey and Martin (2004) Indonesia 6.2 13.1 0.45
Korea 5.3 10 31
Malaysia 0.5 0.2 28.5
Thailand 0.6 4.5 4.5
Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2004) Australia 1.7
Japan 0.13
New Zealand 3.1
Real estate markets
Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006) Australia 39–67 7–20 13–71 0.5
Hong Kong 0.5–14 44–88 0.5
Japan 7–21 16–17 0.01–3.6
Singapore 4–38 28–57 0.5
US 0.5 7–38
Notes: HK Hong Kong, I Indonesia, K Korea, M Malaysia, T Thailand, J Japan, S Singapore, US United States.
a. Asia: joint contagion from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.
b. The range represents results from two separate periods of turmoil in Hong Kong equity markets.
(Goodhart and Dai 2003), and Brazil was to experience its own crisis in early 1999.
Baig and Goldfajn (2001) discuss the transmission of the Russian crisis to Brazil.
To clarify further the evidence presented from the latent-factor models, Table 4 col-
lates the percentage of total contagious linkages which are classiªed as small (less
than 5 percent of total volatility), moderate (between 5 and 30 percent of total vola-
tility), and strong (more than 30 percent of total volatility) within and across regions
as evident in the selected papers. The table shows that 66 percent of all linkages
within a region across the papers are deemed to be either moderate or strong. If
linkages due to the United States, which may be considered to be systemic, are ex-
cluded, the number is still substantial, with 59 percent of linkages considered to be
moderate or strong. Of the cross-regional linkages, 54 percent are regarded as mini-
mal, with the remainder considered moderate once the United States is excluded.
Several other studies support the hypothesis that crises are regional. Yang, Kolari,
and Min (2003) examine the integration of Asian equity markets during the crisis.
They ªnd that the key crisis countries are more integrated during the crisis period
and are also more responsive to external shocks. Goldstein (1998), Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2000), Glick and Rose (1999), and Gerlach and Smets (1995) all emphasize
the importance of regional effects in the transmission of crises.
5.4 Emerging markets experience more contagion than developed markets
Generally, ªnancial crises are thought to be the domain of emerging markets. How-
ever, sometimes crises occur “mysteriously on a worldwide basis” (Wyplosz 2001,
9); that is, they are systemic. The Committee on the Global Finance System (1999)
claims that the Russian crisis affected only emerging markets, while the LTCM crisis
affected developed markets. A similar conclusion is put forward by Bae, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2003), who ªnd that for a range of international equity markets, emerging
markets are more susceptible to international ªnancial crises than developed mar-
kets. Clear examples of developed countries affected by crises are Korea, which is a
member of the OECD, and Hong Kong, which has one of the most liberalized
ªnancial systems in the world. Potential linkages that exist between the markets of
developed and emerging nations include increasing globalization, trade linkages,
foreign direct investment (particularly through the direct investment of ªnancial in-
termediaries), and portfolio investment decisions of investors who seek to diversify
their portfolios by investing in emerging markets.
The proposition that emerging markets experience more contagion than developed
markets is also difªcult to disentangle from the proposition that strong fundamen-
tals mean immunity to contagion. In general, developed markets have stronger fun-
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damentals than emerging economies. The evidence presented in Dungey, Fry, Gon-
zález-Hermosillo, and Martin (2002, 2005c, 2006a) does not support this proposition.
The results are instead mixed and depend on how the impact of a crisis is measured.
In the study of bond markets in the Russian and LTCM crises by Dungey, Fry,
González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2006a), the proportion that contagion contributes
to volatility in developed markets is equivalent to that in emerging markets. For the
same crisis, the proportion of volatility in equity markets due to contagion from
Russia is higher for developed markets than for emerging markets.
The proportions of volatility due to contagion can be transformed into a contagion
levels effect by scaling the proportions in accordance with the observed volatility in
the asset markets. Because of the overall higher level of volatility in emerging mar-
kets in general, the levels effect of contagion is generally smaller in developed mar-
kets than in emerging ones. This point is clearly demonstrated in Table 5, which
presents the volatility decompositions of changes in bond market premia into com-
mon, country-speciªc, regional, and contagion factors for nine emerging and three
developed countries. The volatility decompositions are presented in terms both of
percentage contributions to volatility and of squared basis points. The volatility de-
composition in percentage terms shows that the world factor contributes more than
80 percent to volatility in both types of countries. For the emerging countries, conta-
gion contributes between 0.1 percent (in the case of Russia) and 16 percent (in the
case of Brazil), while for the developed countries, the range is between 0.25 percent
for the United Kingdom and 17 percent for the Netherlands. Even though in per-
centage terms contagion is of similar magnitude across the types of countries, the
second panel of the table shows that 17 percent contagion to the Netherlands is
equivalent to just 4.99 basis points squared, while 16 percent contagion to Brazil is
equivalent to 585.6 squared basis points.
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Table 4. Percentage of important contagious linkages within and across regions as evident
in selected papers
Level of Contagion
Percentage of volatility Minimal 5% Moderate 5–30% Strong 30%
Contagion within regions
All regional linkages 34 39 27
Regional linkages excluding U.S. 27 35 24
Regional linkages excluding U.S. and Australia 38 39 23
Contagion across regions
All cross-regional linkages 56 32 12
Cross-regional linkages excluding U.S. 54 46 0
Note: Papers are Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003, 2004); Dungey and Martin (2004); Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin
(2005b, 2005c, 2006a); Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006).
This is not quite the same as saying that emerging markets experience more conta-
gion than developed markets. Although clearly the absolute level of contagion expe-
rienced does matter for a country’s policymakers, it is not as clear whether policy-
makers should be concerned about the proportionate or the absolute contribution of
contagion.
5.5 Developed ªnancial markets can transmit contagion among regions
The hypothesis that developed markets are a conduit for ªnancial contagion among
emerging markets, as suggested in Frankel and Schmukler (1996) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2003), is consistent with the evidence reported in the papers listed in
Table 1. Support for this proposition is highlighted by comparing Dungey, Fry, and
Martin (2003) and Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006), who study the impact of contagion
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Table 5. Comparison of contagion volatility decomposition of bond markets during the
Russian crisis: Percentage and squared basis points
Country Common
Country-
specific Regional Contagion
Percentage decomposition
Industrials
U.K. 99.74 0.01 n.a. 0.25
U.S. 84.97 11.83 n.a. 3.20
Netherlands 82.29 0.52 n.a. 17.19
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 91.33 0.20 0.52 7.95
Poland 93.71 0.05 0.66 5.59
Russia 94.73 5.06 0.11 0.10
Asia
Indonesia 98.85 0.27 0.21 0.68
Korea 88.85 4.95 0.88 5.32
Thailand 90.52 1.32 0.38 7.78
Latin America
Argentina 86.83 12.68 0.05 0.45
Brazil 83.15 0.18 0.01 16.66
Mexico 99.74 0 0.01 0.26
Squared basis points decomposition
Industrials
U.K. 13.88 0 n.a. 0.04
U.S. 6.38 0.89 n.a. 0.24
Netherlands 23.91 0.15 n.a. 4.99
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 9,138.09 20.38 51.62 795.11
Poland 494.42 0.25 3.48 29.48
Russia 55,685.89 2,973.20 62.97 59.94
Asia
Indonesia 3,085.45 8.39 6.41 21.21
Korea 728.81 40.60 7.22 43.62
Thailand 452.58 6.59 1.88 38.92
Latin America
Argentina 984.34 143.71 0.51 5.12
Brazil 2,923.10 6.47 0.14 585.60
Mexico 525.31 0.01 0.03 1.35
Note: n.a. not applicable.
during the Asian crisis on Australian equity markets. Dungey, Fry, and Martin
(2003) examine contagion from the countries traditionally considered crisis coun-
tries, including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, while Bond,
Dungey, and Fry (2006) focus on the more-developed countries of the Asian region
during the same crises, including Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the United
States. Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003) ªnd little evidence of contagion to Australia
from the traditional crisis countries, while there is much more evidence of contagion
to Australia from the more-developed Asian economies and the United States, par-
ticularly from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan. Both Singapore and Japan seem to
play a key role in transmitting contagion among the countries within the Asian re-
gion. Further supporting evidence can be found in Dungey and Martin (2004, 2006),
in which the majority of the effects transmitted to Australia tend to come through
the U.S. market.
Contagion may also be reinforced by transmissions from other emerging countries
involved in the crisis. In many of the studies examined, two or more countries show
substantial contemporaneous contagion links. For example, in the Dungey, Fry,
González-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005b) application of equity markets during the
collapse of the Hong Kong equity market, there is strong contagion to Malaysia
originating in Hong Kong and strong contagion to Hong Kong originating in Malay-
sia. The inclusion of developed markets in estimating the effects of contagion helps
to provide a clearer picture of the propagation mechanisms.
5.6 Contagion effects differ by asset market
While the characteristics of alternative asset markets are known, it also seems that
different asset markets have different vulnerabilities to contagion effects. In general,
the variation in returns attributable to contagion is relatively smaller in currency
markets and relatively larger in equity markets. It is harder to characterize bond
markets given the smaller body of research. Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and
Martin (2005c, 2006a) investigate the same crises (Russia and LTCM) for both bond
and equity markets, with the result that the proportion of volatility due to contagion
in the bond markets is relatively much smaller. The evidence suggests that among
countries actually involved in a ªnancial crisis, as opposed to those on the periph-
ery, contagion is largest in equity markets and smallest in bond markets, with cur-
rency markets in between.11 This generalization seems to stand regardless of the as-
set market in which the initial shock occurs. In the Russian/LTCM crisis of 1998,
which is broadly considered to have originated in the Russian bond market, the
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11 Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) ªnd volatility in U.S.-dollar-denominated stock returns
during the Asian crisis to be predominantly equity market related, with the notable excep-
tion of Indonesia.
bond market shows less contagion than corresponding equity markets.12 A compari-
son of equity and currency markets in the Asian crisis shows stronger contagion ef-
fects in equities: compare Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2004) for currency markets with
Dungey, Fry, and Martin (2003) for equity markets.
5.7 Contagion occurs between different economies and different asset types
Models that capture linkages both across asset types and across international bor-
ders provide a clearer picture of a crisis; for a historical perspective see Kindelberger
(1996). An important question for researchers and policymakers involves under-
standing how crises evolve. The examples discussed here suggest that single-asset-
type investigations are far too restrictive. The implication is that there is limited
scope for policy or infrastructure reform that concentrates on a single asset type. It is
necessary to consider the interrelationships among all ªnancial assets. This argu-
ment is analogous to the one against the implementation of Tobin taxes in currency
markets, where such taxes simply encourage innovation into other markets. This
suggests also that one potential source for aiding reform is the development of alter-
native ªnancial derivatives; see Allen and Gale (2000).
The empirical results in Dungey and Martin (2006) and Bond, Dungey, and Fry
(2006) support the importance of cross-asset market linkages. Dungey and Martin
(2006) model contagious linkages between equity and currency markets across mul-
tiple countries in the Asian crisis. The results indicate that the contagion effects from
currency markets account for up to 11 percent of equity market volatility, while con-
tagion effects from equity markets account for up to 36 percent of volatility in cur-
rency markets. This proposition has an important implication for minimizing risk
via portfolio diversiªcation. The results clearly show that risk management should
consider both cross-border diversiªcation and cross-asset-type diversiªcation. The
traditional approach in the 1990s of segmenting asset types and managing the risks
for each asset type separately is clearly not risk minimizing in a crisis period.
6. Conclusions: How important is contagion?
The empirical evidence and propositions presented above suggest that contagion ex-
ists and, to some extent, can be characterized as more likely to occur in emerging
countries without clear regard to fundamentals. In general, contagion is regionally
clustered and occurs among countries with strong ªnancial linkages. In addition,
contagion effects spread via developed ªnancial markets, across both country bor-
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12 Although see Dungey, Goodhart, and Tambakis (2005) for the role of turmoil in Hong Kong
equity and currency markets.
ders and asset types, and the nature of the spread of contagion differs by asset mar-
ket. Having ascertained these characteristics, it is vital to examine just how impor-
tant contagion effects are in comparison with myriad factors that may impact
international and domestic ªnancial markets.
The issue to be decided is whether domestic policies or international reforms are the
more appropriate means of dealing with ªnancial market contagion. If crises spread
as a result of pure contagion, then perhaps there is merit in reform of international
ªnancial architecture. Glick and Rose (1999) argue that the regional nature of conta-
gion associated with trade linkages suggests a role for international monitoring. Al-
ternatively, if the main cause of asset market volatility during crises is factors associ-
ated with market, country-speciªc, or idiosyncratic factors, then the appropriate
response is to pay more attention to national policies; see Karolyi (2003).
Finding the source of potentially contagious shocks is an additional complication.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is often not clear which asset markets are in-
volved in the transmission of ªnancial crises. In many crises, turmoil in one asset
type seems to transmit to another. It can be difªcult to identify the true trigger of a
crisis, as for example in the ongoing debate as to whether the ºoat of the Thai baht
can be truly assigned as the beginning of the Asian crisis, as is done in many stud-
ies, or whether the crisis was detectable much earlier in equity markets.
The calculations on the contribution of contagion to observed crisis period volatility
during various crises presented in Table 3 and other tables provide an indication of
the importance of other factors in explaining volatility. The message of the results is
that most of the observed volatility is not due to contagion. There are a number of
exceptions to this, in which contagion effects exceed 50 percent of observed volatil-
ity. However, the general picture suggests that other factors, either singly or in com-
bination, are more important. Khalid and Kawai (2003) ªnd little evidence of conta-
gion, and De Gregorio and Valdés (2001) support this result with their ªndings of
the strong role of fundamentals in crises, compared with contagion effects. On the
other hand, Cartapanis, Dropsy, and Mametz (2002) ªnd that the role of contagion
dominates that of fundamentals.
Contagion effects in currency markets seem to be uniformly small. Potentially,
Karolyi (2003) is correct to single out exchange market reform as a cure for conta-
gion as probably ineffective; see also the mixed results on the effectiveness of ex-
change rate ºexibility in limiting contagion effects in De Gregorio and Valdés (2001).
The ªxed-income-markets example of Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Mar-
tin (2006a) also suggests small contagion effects and that volatility reºects primarily
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other factors. Equity markets experience the most contagion effects, yet there are no
analyses considering reform to equity markets to limit such effects.
The extent of interest in international reform and the measure of contagion effects
seems to be in inverse proportion in the literature: the most attention has been paid
to reform of currency markets, where the contagion effects are limited, and the least
attention to reform of equity markets, where substantial contagion effects are more
evident.
The different asset markets have different contributors to volatility in crisis periods,
and crises spread both across asset markets and across countries. This implies that
there is no one solution for handling a particular crisis, as responses will depend on
the source shock(s) and the propagation mechanism. While it is known that ªnancial
crises are costly (Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebeil, and Martinez-Peria 2001), it may
be that avoiding ªnancial crises is costly in terms of lost economic opportunities as
well. Assessing these relative costs is an extremely difªcult task, but it is one on
which the decisions of international and national policymakers should focus in at-
tempting to develop solutions to reduce ªnancial contagion and crises. Some of
these issues may be about the distribution of costs rather than their reduction to
zero.
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